




ofboththeoretical(e.g. Carlsson& Stankiewicz, 1991; Lundvall, 1992; DeLiso& Metcalfe,
1996; Edquist, 1997) andempirical(e.g. Nelson, 1993; Patel& Pavitt, 1994; Saxenian, 1994;
Carlsson, 1995) nature. As theinnovativeprocessdoesnotfollowa‘linear’, isolatedpath, but
occurswithinspecificinstitutionalcontextsofinteractiver lationshipsbetweendifferent
organisations, conceptssuchasthoseofinnovativeandtechnologicalsystemsappeartobethe





such, butalsotechno-economic— i.e. relatednotonlytothefunctioningoftheinnovativeandof
theproductionsub–systems, butalsoofthemarket(bothdomesticandforeign) andtheinstitutional








‘cores’ and‘terminals’, theinwardoroutwardconfigurationofitspartitions, frombotha










tocombinetwocomplementarymethods, thatis, input-outputanalysisandnetworkanalysis. The
basicrationalewhichunderlinestheuseofinput-outputanalysisinthestudyoftechnological




combiningtheinput-outputableofintermediate(orcapital, if available) goodswithaconformable
matrixofsectoralinnovativefforts(R&D), thusobtainingaparticular‘input-output’ matrixof
innovationflows, RÝn× nÞ. footnote 
Sinceitmeasuresinnovativeflowsthatare‘embodied’ intheproductiveflowsexchanged
amongsectors, R canactuallyaccountfortechno-economickindsofrelationships, whichare
shapedbothbytheinnovativesub-system(proxiedwiththeR&D expenditure) andbythe
productivesub-system(proxiedwiththeinput-outputables). Furthermore, if, asinthepresent





















, 0 < D < 1.   #   
It isstraightforwardthatgreatervaluesof( ref: eq1 ) indicatedensernetworks. Thedensityof
thenetworkcorrespondingtoatechnologicalsystemcanthusbeassumedtomeasureitsinternal
cohesion. Thatis, thehigheristhedensityofthenetwork, themoreconnectedisthetechnological
system, andviceversa.
Inavaluednetwork, suchasthatofthetechnologicalsystemoftheC matrix, the‘actual’
numberofedges(inthiscasethenumberofinnovativeflows) isusuallythenumberofedges





dic = 1if Cij>k; Cij
dic = 0if Cij²k.   #   
As thechoiceofanexogenous, usuallyarbitrary, thresholdvaluefork isoneofthemain
limitationsofthisindicator, foreachtechnologicalsystemwehavebuiltupaseriesofdichotomised
matricesbyusing, ratherthanascalar, k, asetofcut-offvectors, k1,k2, ...,kz , eachonemade




considertheirdiagrammaticrepresentations: i odoing, it isnecessarytoselectonecountryzD
andtoworkoutthedensitydistributionsofallthesystemsofthesamplewithrespecttokzD . It is





theothernodesofanetwork(Freeman, 1979). footnote Formally, theinward(in) andtheoutward
(out) degreecentralitiesofacertainodej areingeneraldefinedasfollows:
Gin
j = > iin;Goutj = > iout   #   
whereiin andioutindicateoneoftheedgeswhichcomes, respectively, inandoutofnodej. It is
henceimmediatehat0 < GÝ6Þ




























  #   
whereGjD isthecentralityvalueofthemostcentralnode, jD, eitheroutwardorinward.
Accordingto( ref: eq4 ), thecentralisationindicesmeasurethe‘centrality-gap’ betweeneach
nodeandthemostcentralone, relativetothemaximumlevelofcentralityofanetworkcomposed
bynnodes(i.e. Ýn? 1ÞÝn? 2Þ). Ingeneral, thus, ahighindexofcentralisationidentifiesanetwork
withwidegapsbetweenthe(centrality) positionsofthenodes, whilealowvalueidentifiesa
networkwithsimilar(centrality) positions. Inthepresentcase, thiscorrespondstotechnological
systemswhosesectoralpartitionscanbedeemed, respectively, ‘hierarchic’(i.e. highdegree
centralisation) and‘parithetic’ (i.e. lowdegreecentralisation). Theformercaseislessconduciveto
interactiveinnovativerelationshipsthanthelatter.
A secondsystemwideapplicationofthecentralityindicescanbeobtainedbyexaminingtheir
sectoraldistributions. Inthiswayit is, forexample, possibletoidentifythecompositionofa
technologicalsystemintermsofinnovative‘cores’ and‘terminals’. Intuitively, wedefine‘cores’


















biunivocal) and(possibly) ‘developmentblocks’ (DeBresson, 1996, pp. 167-168). Onthecontrary,
standardornonstandard‘trees’ and‘cycles’, ormoresimple‘technologicalcomplexes’ donot







Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Italy, TheNetherlandsandtheUnitedKingdom)
alongthreetemporalspans(early80s, middle80s, andearly90s). footnote 
Theanalysisofthedensitydistributions(Section3.1) isperformedwithrespecttothevectorof






graphs(Section3.2) arecarriedoutwithrespecttoauniquethresholdvalue. Inparticular, facinga
trade-offbetween‘indistinguishable’ (withtoomanylinks) and‘trivial’ (withtoofewlinks)





(i) In thefirstperiod(Figure3.1), Japan, GermanyandFranceclusterasthemostdense
technologicalsystemsalongthewholecut-offsdistribution, hintingtheopportunityofgreater












networks. WiththeexceptionofTheNetherlands, whichstilllagbehindintermsofdensity, also
thelessconnectedtechnologicalsystemsgetmorealigned. Onlywithrespecttoalimitedrangeof
intermediatecut-offvalues, Australia, anothersmallcountry, laysquiteapartfromthegroupofthe
other, whichappearsnowmorehomogeneousfollowingthesubstantialgainofDenmark.




Germany, althoughonlyforintermediatecut-offvalues, whileFrancekeepstayingapart. Onthe
otherhand, therangeofcut-offvaluesforwhichAustralialagsbehindismorenarrowthaninthe
secondperiod.
Ingeneralterms, theanalysisofthedensityshowstwomainfacts. Firstofall, theclusteringof
theinvestigatedtechnologicalsystemsarehighlyaffectedbystructurale ements, uchas, for






countries footnote , aclearlagpersistsbetweenthetwogroups. Therefore, itseemslikelyto




0.005), thesectoralanalysisofcentrality(Tables3.1to3.3) confirmsome‘stylizedfacts’ and
someintuitionsonecandrawontheparticularfocusofthisstudy.
Althoughatdifferentdegreesindifferenttechnologicalsystemsandperiods, footnote themost
traditionalsectors— i.e. food, beveragesandtobacco(Sector1), textilesandleather(Sectors2),
woodandfurniture(Sector3) andpaperandprinting(Sector4) — arealldependent, asthe
‘indegrees’ arehigherthanthecorrespondent‘outdegrees’. Inparticular, withtheonlyexceptionof
Japan(andoftheGermanpapersectorinthefirsttwoperiods), thesamesectorsare‘totally’
dependent’, asthe‘outdegrees’ arenil: the‘supplierdominated’ natureofthesebranchesappears
thereforeconfirmed(Pavitt, 1984). Anothergeneralresultconcernsthemostpervasivesectorsof
eachtechnologicalsystem. Withsomefewexceptions— notablythatofJapan footnote — these
areactuallya‘specializedsupplier’ sector— metalproducts(Sector10) — anda‘science-based’
sector— chemicalproducts(Sector5) — whosetechnologyhasadominant‘material’ natureand
whicharethereforeprominentwhen‘embodied’ innovativeflowsareconsidered. This
interpretationbviouslybetterfitstheformersectorthat, unlikethelatter, isactually‘totally’
pervasive, i.e. withanil‘indegree’ (stillapartfromJapanandfromGermanyinthelastperiod).
Thesamekindofargumentalsoholdsforthosesectors— suchasshipbuildingandrepairing











branches, andwithaquite‘hierarchic’ structure(highoutdegreec ntralisation), ismadeupof
Australia, Canada, Denmark, TheNetherlandsandtheUnitedKingdom. Anotherone, whosecore
ofpervasivesectorsextendsmoresubstantiallyalsotoothersectors(inadditiontoSector5and
10), andwhosestructureisrelativelymore‘parithetic’ (lowoutdegreec ntralisation) comprehends
France, Germany, andJapan. Thispartitionresemblesprettywellothertaxonomiesthat, mainly
focussingonpurelyinnovativeandatomisticquestions, ‘split’ thesamegroupofcountrieswith
respecttotheirsize, theirR&D intensities, patentsscores, educationallevels, andsoon(see, for
example, Nelson, 1993). However, asthepresentoneistracedaccordingtotechno-economicand














theextension(intermsofoutdegreec ntrality) isnotverybig, sothathecorrespondentoutdegree
centralisationsarenearlythesame.
As farasthesecondclusterisconcerned, FranceandGermanyappeartobeonceagainquite
similar, asshownbytheoutdegreec ntralisationindices. Themetal-chemicalinnovativecoreis
nowmorebalancedtowardsmaximumoutwardcentralityvalues, andalsowider. Themachinery
sector(Sector11) isalmostasmuchpervasiveasSector10and5, aswellasthe‘resource







thewidest, asitspansfromsector5tosector11, atnearlymaximumvalues. Furthermore, the
sectorsofthe‘terminal’ — thatisthetraditionalones(Sectors1-4) — arelessdependent, withthe
consequencethathe(outdegree) centralisationindexislowerthaninthepreviousystems.
(ii) Comingtothesecondperiod(Table3.2), Australia, notablyanothersmallandquiteisolated
systemsofinnovation(Gregory, 1993), joinstheclusterofthemost‘polarised’ technological
systems. ThedualpervasivecoreofDenmarkgetsmorebalanced(betweenSector5and10) and
extends, althoughatalesserextent, omachineries(Sector11). Thisseemstohinttothefactthat
the‘systemicevolution’ oftheDanish(butalsooftheSwedish) systembenefitedfromanactive
specialisedsuppliercore, althoughwithaconsistentforeignpenetration(Edquist& Lundvall,
1993). In thisrespect, Denmark‘overcomes’ Canada, whosecorejustsubstitutes‘energy’ (Sector





(Sector11) andnon-finishedmetals(Sector9). Inspiteofthischange, andoftheslightdecrease
forJapanandincreaseforGermany, respectively, inthecentralityindeceswithinthe‘resource
intensive’ partition(Sectors6-9), theRhenish-Japanesedichotomystillpersists.





position. Onceagain, thisseemstobeacaseofconditionalcatching-up, inducedbyastructural
changetowardsmoresynergeticnterrelationships. A imilarpatterncanbeidentifiedforthe
UnitedKingdom, whosetwo-sectorpervasivecorebecomesmorebalancedtoo. A ‘dynamic’
sub-cluster, madeupofDenmarkandUnitedKingdom, seemsthereforeidentifiablewithinthe
formercluster, asopposedtoa‘structurallymyopic’ one, madeupofAustraliandCanada.
Themostremarkablechangesoftheperiodarehoweverinthesecondcluster. Althoughthe
centralisationisunchanged, Germanyradicallychangesthedistributionofitspervasivecore, which










(Sector11) andrubberandplastic(Sector7) determinesa lightlossofconnectivity(higher
outdegreec ntrality).
Orientedgraphs
At theoutset, letusobservehowtheorientedgraphsoftheC0,005dic matrices(Figure3.4–3.6)
makethetwoclustersdiscussedaboveimmediatelyapparent. Ontheonehand, wehaveAustralia,
Canada, Denmark, TheNetherlandsandtheUnitedKingdom, withasetofrelativelyfew
‘innovativecouples’, exclusively(ornearlyexclusively) univocal, andmainly(orsolely) basedon









(Sector5) innovatesonlysomeofthem, namelytraditional(e.g. Sectors2, 3and4) andresource

















othercasestheyconstituteasortofperipheralcore. Extra-corediffusionislessexceptional, if not
evennormal(asinthecaseofJapan).
A moreprecisespecificationoftheseregularities, andoftheirtemporalevolution, obviously
callsforaperiod-by-periodanalysis.
(i) In theearly80s(Figure3.4), andwithinthefirstcluster, TheNetherlandsandtheUnited
Kingdom, unlikeCanadandDenmark, showacorewhichmarginallyextendsalsotothe
machinerysector(Sector11), asitpervadesonlythemostadjacentbranches, thoseoftransport






chemicaltransformation(Sectors5, 6and8), anda‘pheripericcore’, madeupofsyntheticand
(nonfinished) metallicproducts(Sectors7and9), andof(finished) metalproducts(Sector10) and
machineries(Sector11). However, theformer(Sectors7and9) areneitherlinkedbetweenthem
norwithothersingularnodes, whilethelatter(Sectors10and11) exceptionallydonotinnovatethe
chemicals(Sector5) andsomeothertraditionalndresourceintensivesectors. InFranceandin




Exceptionally, someoftheJapanesetraditionalsectors(e.g. Sector2and3, Sectors3and4)
constitutebiunivocalinnovativecouplesandalsoreachtheresidualsector(Sector15). Another
relevantextra-corediffusionisthatofGermanmotorveichles(Sector13), affecting, inadditionto
Sector4and8, asinFrance, alsotraditionalsectors, uchasSector1, 2and3.




1). footnote A similartrendcanbeobservedformachineries(Sector11), inparticularinthe
BritishandintheDanishsystems, whereitsingularlyinnovatealsosome‘upper’ sectors(i.e.
Sector2, 4, 6and8), showinghowthetraditionalndtheresourceintensivesectorsherebenefit
fromvirtuousbackwardlinkages. InTheNetherlandsthesamelinkagesareinsteadlimitedtothe
‘lower’ sectors(i.e. Sectors12, 13, 14and15).
Thestructureofthetechnologicalsystemswithinthesecondgroupofcountriesi identicalto
thepreviousperiod, butitsspecificationisslightlychanged. TheJapanesenergyproductssector




rubberandplastic(Sector7) decreasesinJapan, gettingdisconnectedfromSectors5, 8, 9, 10and
11, whileit increasesinFranceandinGermany. ThesameholdsfortheFrenchenergyproducts
(Sector6), whiletheGermanoneonlyinnovatesSector1. A similardicothomyholdsforthe
ferrousandnon-ferrousmetalproducts(Sector9), thediffusionsofwhichareinGermanylimited
totheresidualsector(Sector15), whileinFrancetheyareconnectedtotheperipheralcore, mainly
innovatingSectors12, 13, 14and15. As farastheextra-corediffusionsareconcerned, the
traditional, biunivocal, innovativecouplesofJapan, andtheunivocal, motorveichlesbased,
innovativecouplesofFranceand, especially, ofGermanyarestillthemostrepresentative.
(iii) In theearly90s(Figure3.6), thefirstclusterconfirmsthedichotomybetweenAustralia
andtheremainingtechnologicalsystems. Here, inturn, CanadaisclearlydistinctfromtheUnited
KingdomandDenmarkatleastintworespects. Ontheonehand, theirchemicalsector(Sector5)
getsclosertotheroleithasinthebig-countriescluster(it innovatesthemostimmaterialtechnology
basedsectors(Sectors13, 14, 15, and, intheUnitedKingdom, alsoSectors11and12). Onthe
otherhand, asimilarargumentholdsformachineries(Sector11), whichalsoreachsometraditional





Herealsoimportantchangesareobservable. Themostrelevantis, aswealreadysaid, thatof
Germany, whichdegeneratesinanenlargedsupercoreofmostlypervasiveandinterlockedsectors,
madeupofchemicals(Sector5), metalproducts(Sector10), machineries(Sector11) and
motorveichles(Sector13). AlsoFrance nlargesthestandard‘5-10-11-Sectorcore’, withthe
additionofrubberandplastic(Sector7). Theperipheralcoreoftheresourceintensivesectors
generallyreducesitsoutdegreec ntrality. Japanmaintainsitsidiosyncraticstructure, andalsothe
sectoralspecificationofboththesupercoreandtheperipheralcore(exceptforthediminishing
pervasiveroleofrubberandplastic). Smallchangesonlyoccurintheextra-corediffusions: paper
andprinting(Sector4) increasesitsinnovativeweight, diffusing, inadditiontoalltheother



















groupings, althoughnotcompletelyhomogeneousandstable. A firstcluster, withaquite
‘hierarchic’ structure, ismadeupofAustralia, Canada, Denmark, TheNetherlandsandtheUnited














(chemicals, metalproducts, machineries, andmotorveichles), withmaximum(ornearlymaximum)
outwardcentrality. Theremainingsectorsturnintototallydependent, andthisseemstopointoutto
anintensive, ratherthananextensive, structuralchange, addressedtofocusonandexploithe
externalitiesofthemainsectoralspecialisations. ThesecondsubstantialchangeisthatofDenmark
(andtoalesserextentoftheUnitedKingdom) whichinthesecond, andespeciallyinthethird
period, getsclosertothestructureofthe‘Rhenish–Japanese’ cluster. Thischangeismainlydueto
thepervasiveroleacquiredbythemachinerysector, withwhichtheothersectorsgetmore
verticallyintegrated.
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Australia 1986, 1989 1986, 1989
Canada 1981, 1986, 1990 1981, 1986, 1990
Denmark 1980, 1985, 1990 1980, 1985, 1990
France 1980, 1985, 1990 1980, 1985, 1990
Germany 1978, 1986, 1990 1978, 1986, 1990
Japan 1980, 1985, 1990 1980, 1985, 1990
UnitedKingdom 1979, 1984, 1990 1979, 1984, 1990
TheNetherlands 1981, 1986 1981, 1986
Source: OECD, DSTI (STAN, OECD, DSTI (STAN,






4 Paper, paperproducts, printingandpublishing
5 Chemicalindustry, drugsandmedicines
6 Energyproducts
7 Rubberandplasticsproducts
8 Non-metallicmineralproducts
9 Ferrousandnon-ferrousmetals
10 Metalproducts
11 Non-electricalmachineryandelectronics
12 Shipbuildingandrepairing
13 Motorvehiclesandothermeansoftransport
14 Professionalgoods
15 Othermanufacturing
